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Like Bill Poole’s, my associations with both Frank Morris and the
issues of this conference go back a long way. In the mid 1960s I was a
graduate student and research assistant for Karl Brunner at UCLA when
he was host of a couple of conferences called “Targets and Indicators for
Monetary Policy.” My role at these conferences was to change the tapes
on the reel-to-reel tape recorder, then spend weeks transcribing what was
said by all the eminent economists who participated.
The issues addressed in those conferences were the same as those
subsequently addressed by the FOMC Committee on the Directive. At
that time, my association with Frank was not nearly as direct as Poole’s.
Later, however, I had a couple of opportunities to revisit the topics of
reserve and monetary aggregate targets in debates with Frank.
On one occasion in the early 1980s, I was invited to the University of
California at Berkeley to discuss monetary policy and inﬂation with
Frank Morris and James Tobin. At one point Professor Tobin said that the
Federal Reserve should offer to buy long-term government bonds in the
open market at a price that would produce a yield of 4 percent, and the
Fed should hold long-term bond yields at the 4 percent rate until full
employment was reached. Frank said, “But, Jim, we might wind up
buying them all.” And Professor Tobin replied, “So?”
On another occasion in 1993, after I had returned to the Federal
Reserve and Frank had retired, I was invited by Frank’s daughter, Lisa
Grobar, a professor of economics in California, to participate in a
program with Frank entitled “Searching for a Monetary Policy Target.”
By that time both Frank and I had concluded that the most serious
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ment to an ultimate objective of price stability. In this discussion of
Poole’s paper, I will revisit several of the issues we raised in that
program.
I agree with Poole that reading the Memorandum of Discussion of
1970 is interesting and important, but I would also recommend that all of
you read the Memorandum of Discussion of February 14, 1972. The entire
meeting was devoted to discussing the third report of the Committee on
the Directive, which I believe was also the ﬁnal report of that committee.
The meeting concluded by recommending an experimental approach to
recasting the directive to the Trading Desk. In my remarks this morning,
I am also going to highlight a few of the issues raised in that meeting that
I think parallel and complement the issues that Poole raises in his paper.
THE DEBATE CIRCA 1993
Before turning back to the recommendations of the Committee on the
Directive, I want to take a few minutes to highlight some of the issues
Frank and I raised in 1993. I believe the perspective we came to share
illustrates what Poole identiﬁes as the strategic outlook that currently
pervades FOMC discussions.
In 1993, I reﬂected back on the 1960s and noted how I had failed to
appreciate the context in which the UCLA conferences had been con-
ducted. At the time of the conferences, inﬂation had been under 2 percent
for more than a decade, followed by a couple of years (1964 and 1965)
when it jumped into the range of 3 or 4 percent. It was thought then that
the problem was only one of choosing the appropriate reserve and money
targets and indicators—that is, the levers or handles for monetary
policy—that would serve as instruments for formulating and implement-
ing policy. The mindset of the American people at that time, I think, was
that increases in inﬂation and interest rates were temporary, destined to go
back down, sometime.
Later, after more than two decades of inﬂation, the mindset of the
American people seemed to be that declines in inﬂation and interest rates
were temporary. People started to believe that the permanent condition
was rising inﬂation and interest rates.
Coming back to the Fed after some seventeen years, I initially
thought the question was “Which M?” The Cleveland Fed staff persis-
tently said to me, “It’s the objective, stupid, not the target, that is the real
issue!” And, for a while, I kept saying, not only to myself but also to my
colleagues, that I thought the objective was quite clear. The staff kept
telling me I was naive.
26 Jerry L. JordanSome years back, I heard about Goodhart’s Law.1 I think Henry
Wallich ﬁrst told me about it and wrote about it. The idea is that once a
central bank reveals that it is using a certain variable as an indicator or
intermediate target because of some past empirical relationship to a
speciﬁc objective, that variable ceases to be reliably related to the
objective. The analogy was something from physics called the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle, which arose after that scientist realized that focus-
ing a high-powered microscope on an electron alters the behavior of the
electron. Therefore, you can never see it behaving as it would if it were
not being observed. Similarly, once people know the central bank is
responding to some operating target, their behavior changes—the people
being traders in bond, equity, and foreign exchange markets, as well as
real people. Then, because people change their behavior in anticipation of
what the central bank is going to do based on these indicators, the
outcome is not the same as it otherwise would have been.
I now think that Goodhart’s Law is relevant only if monetary policy
is not anchored by clear, well-understood objectives, that is, a clear
strategy for achieving and maintaining price stability. If everyone under-
stands and acts on the belief that the objective will be achieved, people
will not care about the intermediate targets or instrument variables. So, I
am going to assert a corollary to Goodhart’s Law. That is, if the monetary
authorities have as an objective the stable purchasing power of money—
and this objective is known and credible, such that the actions of
households and businesses reﬂect this knowledge and belief—then the
operating target becomes a secondary issue.
Milton Friedman taught us that having and hitting any monetary
growth target was superior to a pure discretionary policy. However, this
Friedman dictum is valid in the absence of policy being anchored by a
clear objective. I am not so certain that an anchored policy is ﬂawed just
because implementation involves discretion. All of the debate about rules
versus discretion that we saw in the profession for a couple of decades I
now think implied the absence of an unambiguous long-run objective.
WHERE THINGS WENT WRONG
Poole cited the work we did at the St. Louis Fed as one motivating
factor for the creation of the Committee on the Directive. A lot of what we
did at St. Louis, including my own writing at that time, assumed the
context of demand management. Think about the implied message—that
the role of monetary policy is to manage demand or spending. That clearly
is wrong. It gave a lot of people the idea that an activist discretionary
1 See Goodhart, C.A.E., Monetary Theory and Practice: The U.K. Experience, Macmillan,
London, 1984, p. 96.
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growth, the rate of inﬂation, levels of employment, the unemployment
rate, and so on. And people had the idea that it was appropriate to use
monetary policy to pursue “countercyclical stabilization policy” to offset
either real shock effects or shocks emanating from the government sector.
Right up to the present we still hear references to the idea that monetary
policy must be adjusted based on what happens on the ﬁscal side, or what
happens to oil prices.
While I now think that most of the discussion about activist mone-
tary policies is nonsense, it did derive from the work that I and others
were involved in, back in the 1960s and 1970s. We should not have
allowed the emphasis of our work to appear to suggest that monetary
targeting was about creating alternative levers for monetary authorities to
push and pull to achieve some sort of unspeciﬁed and frequently
changing objectives. What we failed to make clear was a crucial under-
lying premise of monetarism—the Hayekian principle2 that a market
economy, based on private property and using prices to allocate re-
sources, is inherently resilient and naturally gravitates toward full use of
its productive resources in the absence of various types of shocks
emanating from the government sector.
THE DEBATE CIRCA 1972
Let me now turn back to the FOMC debate regarding the third report
of the Committee on the Directive in February of 1972. Committee
members and Federal Reserve Board staff covered the full range of
opinions of the economics profession at the time regarding both the
desirability and the effectiveness of incorporating reserves and monetary
targeting in policy decisions. Some expressed considerable conﬁdence
that the relationship between various monetary aggregates and nominal
spending or inﬂation was sufﬁciently reliable that the issue in achieving
the desired outcome was ﬁnding and adopting operating instruments, or
“handles,” as they chose to refer to them. Others did not see the merits of
incorporating monetary aggregates in the decision process, either because
they did not believe the respective money velocities were sufﬁciently
predictable, or because they did not believe that operating instruments
were available for achieving desired growth rates of the aggregates, or
sometimes both.
2 Hayek explains how markets coordinate the optimal utilization of resources in “The
Use of Knowledge in Society,” The American Economic Review XXXV, No. 4, September 1945,
pp. 510-30. A summary of his arguments against the Keynesian notion of equilibrium
unemployment can be found in his book A Tiger by the Tail, The Institute for Economic
Affairs, London, 1971.
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desired money growth rates—and that money growth rates were sufﬁ-
ciently related to nominal income or inﬂation to be relied on—questioned
whether the byproduct of interest rate ﬂuctuations would be acceptable.
Some wanted to have a reserve target with a proviso that interest rate
ﬂuctuations would be contained within an acceptable band, while others
wanted to have an interest rate target with a proviso that reserve growth
or money growth would be within an acceptable band. An irony is that
some who opposed reserve targeting in 1972, on the grounds that it
would be accompanied by unacceptable interest rate ﬂuctuations, sup-
ported reserve targeting later, in 1979, precisely because it was expected
that large and desirable changes in interest rates would occur.
During the 1972 debate, Frank Morris argued that the reason the
Committee on the Directive recommended adopting reserve targeting as
a way of achieving desired monetary growth rates was to avoid the kind
of mistakes that had been made under a money market condition
strategy. His arguments then are still valid more than a quarter century
later. Speciﬁcally, he said:
The FOMC had been very slow to react to signals that it was supplying
reserves much more rapidly or slowly than economic conditions warranted.
Perhaps the best example was in the second half of 1968 when, in an effort to
resist rising interest rates, the Fed had supplied more reserves than any
member would have thought desirable at that time. If the Committee contin-
ued to employ a money market strategy, it was highly likely to repeat that
mistake in 1972, since interest rates probably would come under upward
pressure as the economy expanded. By focusing on money market conditions,
the Committee would again tend to resist the rise, supplying excessive
reserves in the process and not recognizing that fact until well after the
damage had been done.
Note that Morris’s argument does not involve a direct link between
interest rates and economic objectives. Rather, it was a concern about
appropriate reserve growth—or what some might call central bank
liquidity, others base money.
Over the next decade, the M1 velocity (really the variance around the
trend of the M1 velocity) was quite reliable, leading to the belief that if the
central bank conducted monetary policy (open market operations) so as
to hit an M1 target, it also would achieve a desired nominal GDP growth.
So, part of the legislation in 1980 moved the ﬁnancial system toward what
were called uniform and universal reserve requirements—reserve re-
quirements only on transactions liabilities and the same reserve ratio on
all transactions liabilities at all institutions, so that as balances bounced
around from a credit union to a savings and loan to a bank and from a big
bank to a little bank, and so on, they would not release and absorb
reserves in an erratic way, causing noise in the multiplier. Along about
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Garn/St Germain legislation—M1 got dethroned. While an effort was
made to improve the monetary control side, the connection to something
we cared about seemed to break down as the velocity of M1 started to
become much more interest elastic.
By the time Frank and I had our debate in 1993, it was pretty clear to
most people that the prior statistical relationships could no longer be
relied upon. The link between open market operations and money
growth was not so reliable as once thought. The link between measures
of money and the rate of inﬂation or nominal income growth also was
changing.
SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
It is quite obvious that monetary targeting is not a sufﬁcient condition
for a satisfactory monetary policy. Whether or not it is a necessary
condition is still debatable. I do think that having a clear objective
(strategy) for monetary policy is necessary. I am still waiting for people to
persuade me that it is, or is not, sufﬁcient. Poole cautions us that we
ignore money at our own peril. I strongly concur in that belief. Not
targeting money is one thing, ignoring it altogether is another matter. I
think the use of a “proviso clause” in the directive in the 1970s served the
FOMC very well. It may again in the future.
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